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Abstract 
If decision-relevant information is distributed among team members, the group is inclined 
to focus on shared information and to neglect unshared information, resulting often in suboptimal 
decisions. This classical finding is robust in experimental settings, in which the distribution of 
information is created artificially by an experimenter. The current paper looks at information 
sharing effects when access to information is not restricted, and decision makers are very 
familiar with the decision task. We analyzed archival search and discussion data obtained from 
business executives completing a personnel selection exercise. Information popularity in the 
population from which groups were composed predicted number of group members accessing 
items during information searches and whether the group discussed the items. The number of 
group members who accessed an item predicted whether information was repeated during 
discussion, and repetition predicted which items were included on an executive summary. 
Moreover, cognitively central group members were more influential than cognitively peripheral 
members. One implication is that collective decision making amplifies what is commonly known 
at the expense of disseminating what is not. 
 
Keywords: Information Sharing, Cognitive Centrality, Group Decision Making, Collective 
Choice, Archival Data 
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The reasons for delegating decisions to groups are varied but they often are related to one 
of two goals (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). One goal is identify what is commonly believed or 
preferred among a set of stakeholders. Serving this goal requires zooming in on shared 
perspectives and knowledge. Another goal is to collate members’ diverse perspectives and 
information. In pursuit of this latter goal, group discussion is often used as a mechanism for 
combining members’ unique contributions in an attempt to construct a more complete and 
balanced account of the decision options. Serving this goal requires zooming out to encompass 
the unique bits of information that each member can add to the collective account. For example, 
consider a group of fund managers constructing collectively an investment portfolio. On the one 
hand, they could discuss what they know in common and, based on this common ground, 
allocate funds based on the popularity of the investment options among the fund managers. On 
the other hand, they could discuss extensively the investment options, combining their unique 
knowledge in an attempt to identify which options offer the greatest potential for financial 
growth. Based on this pooled knowledge, each manager may revise her assessments of the 
options leading to group selections that none of the managers favoured initially. Zooming in on 
the common information and zooming out to encompass unique information are quite different 
processes and may often lead to different collective decisions (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; 
Larsen & Christensen, 1993; Stasser, 1999). In this paper, we report the analysis of archival data 
obtained from teams of executives completing a collective personnel selection task. We explored 
whether collective decision making zoomed in or out by tracking what information individual 
members accessed during searches of the candidate databases and what information they 
discussed en route to a collective decision and to constructing an executive summary. Moreover, 
we examined whether members at the intersection of others’ knowledge (cognitively central) 
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were more or less influential than members who possessed unique information (cognitively 
peripheral). Zooming in on the core of common knowledge would promote the influence of 
cognitively central members whereas zooming out to encompass unique information would 
promote the influence of peripheral members.  
In the following section we discuss Persuasive Arguments Theory, a classic theory of 
group influence based on ideas of how information is distributed among decision makers and the 
types of information that they exchange.  Although the theory has not been the focus of recent 
empirical work, it nevertheless postulates that novel information exchanged within a group will 
have the greater influence than commonly known information. Subsequently, we will review a 
more recent model that is based on a collective sampling metaphor and proposes that common 
information will be more likely to be mentioned and more influential than unique information.  
The empirical evidence for this model stems primarily from situations where information 
distributions were experimentally controlled rather than arising naturally.  
Persuasive Arguments and Assembly Bonuses 
Burnstein and Vinokur (1973, 1977) argued that the information content of group 
discussions affects members’ opinions and hence their collective decisions and judgments. 
Group members are rational information processors, who in a group discussion respond to new 
information and arguments. They originally advanced their theory to account for the typical 
finding that discussions polarize, rather than moderate, judgments. At the core of the theory is 
the proposition that judgments change because members of the group contribute unique 
arguments and information that others in the group did not know or had forgotten. That is, 
unique arguments and information are persuasive; common information and arguments do not 
change minds. A large body of empirical evidence supports their theory, showing for example 
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that changes in risk preference are related to the proportion of risky to cautious arguments in a 
discussion and that novel arguments produce larger judgmental shifts than common ones 
(Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; Vinokur and Burnstein, 1974: see also, Myers & Lamm, 1976, for a 
review of group polarization). 
The idea that diversity can improve the quality of decisions also rests on the idea that 
unique perspectives and information are potentially persuasive. Diverse perspectives and 
information often produce dissent during the decision process, and dissent improves decision 
quality as long as it does not compromise loyalty to the group and commitment to the decision 
(Dooley & Fryxell, 1999).  
Both persuasive arguments theory and the proposition that cognitive diversity improves 
decision quality assume that old information is already integrated into members’ judgments and 
preferences and that new information produces shifts of judgment and changes of preference. 
Additionally, the “diversity produces quality decisions” argument presumes that there is an 
assembly bonus effect (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964). By contributing their unique knowledge, 
members can assemble a more complete picture of the decision options and thereby increase the 
prospect of identifying a better decision option than the majority would favor given incomplete 
knowledge.  
In general, an information processing function of group discussion implicitly assumes 
that groups can in theory make better decisions than their individual members acting alone. 
Groups have the potential to make better decisions than individuals, if (1) n heads know more 
than one, (2) individuals exchange critical, new information with one another, (3) others accept 
this information as valid, and (4) the group uses their pooled information to make an informed 
decision (Hastie, 1986; Stasser, 1992). From an information pooling perspective, information 
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that is known to only one group member is an important commodity that an individual brings to 
the group decision-making table. Indeed, expertise is often defined by uniquely held information. 
As such, experts are perceived to have specialized, unique knowledge of a topic, process, or task, 
and they are often ascribed high status as a testament to the value of holding unique information 
(e.g., Bottger, 1984).  
Thus, the diversity leads to quality argument is compelling both theoretically and 
intuitively. Nonetheless, there is considerable empirical evidence that groups frequently do not 
consider the diversity of information available to them and that they risk making suboptimal 
decisions, particularly when unique information is critical to a good decision (Gruenfeld, 
Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996; Hollingshead, 1996; Stasser & Titus, 1985). 
Biased Information Sampling 
Recent  experimental evidence documents that widely-shared information tends to 
dominate discussions and uniquely-held information is often omitted from discussion (see, 
Stasser & Titus, 2003, for a recent review). Two reasons for this discussion bias favoring 
common information are advocacy and information sampling dynamics. 
In advocacy, members bias their contributions to discussion to support their initial 
preferences (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, and Moscovici, 2000; Stasser and Titus, 1985; 
Stasser, 1988). This bias may arise for several reasons. First, information that is consistent with 
one's preference may be more salient when searching for items to contribute to discussion. 
Second, members may be prone to defend their initial choices. Because common information 
affects everyone’s initial preference (the common knowledge effect; Gigone and Hastie, 1993, 
1997), defending initial preferences will tend to promote the discussion of common information.  
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The structural effects of collective information sampling also favor common information 
over unique information. Even in the absence of advocacy, groups are more likely to mention an 
item of common information than an equally salient item of unique information. Stasser and 
Titus’s (1987) collective information sampling (CIS) model suggests that one reason why 
common information is discussed more often is due to sampling probabilities. Their model states 
that the probability that a piece of information will be mentioned is a function of how many 
people could potentially mention it and the likelihood that any one of those members will 
mention it. According to this model, common information has a greater probability of being 
discussed than unique information because of the greater number of people who know common 
information and can mention it (see Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989, for a direct empirical test of 
the CIS). 
 Studies have identified a number of factors that reduce, but do not eliminate, the bias in 
discussion favoring common information. For example, making members publicly aware of who 
is likely to know more in domain or category of information increases the amount of unique 
information mentioned but does not eliminate the advantage to common information (Stasser, 
Vaughan, & Stewart, 2000). Increasing the amount of information discussed (e.g., by requiring 
or promoting longer discussions) sometimes facilitates the discussion of unique information 
(Larson et al, 1996), but also often increases the amount of common information discussed 
(Stasser, et al, 1989). Thus, the dominance of common information remains even in long 
discussions that air extensive amounts of information. 
What is Influential? 
The advantage to common information extends beyond what is mentioned during 
discussion. Contrary to a central tenet of persuasive arguments theory, common information 
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seems to draw more attention than unique information when mentioned during discussion. This 
extended advantage to common information has been documented in several ways. Groups are 
more likely to repeat common, than unique, information later in discussion (Stasser, et al., 1989; 
Larson et al., 1996). After discussion, members are more likely to correctly remember common, 
than unique, information that was mentioned during discussion (Stewart and Stasser, 1995). 
Also, in written summaries of their discussions, groups are more likely to include the common, 
than the unique, items (Stewart and Stasser, 1995). 
This increased attention and retention of common, as compared to the unique, 
information that emerges in discussion may be due to people giving more weight to information 
that they have already considered before discussion. For example, Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt 
(2003) gave individuals information favoring a suboptimal choice and then let them read a group 
discussion protocol containing full information exchange, which, if fully analyzed, would have 
favored the optimal option. Still individuals tended to decide for the alternative based on the 
initial information that they were given. Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt argued that this reliance 
on pre-discussion information is due to a preference-consistent evaluation of information. At the 
level of the group, this reliance on already known information by individuals means that 
common information is viewed as more important than unique information. When everybody 
pays more attention to the information they initially have, unique information gained during 
discussion is less likely to influence their judgments. However, in all the experimental studies on 
the effects of information sharing in decision making groups the distribution of information was 
controlled. What was shared and unshared prior to discussion was determined by the 
experimenter, and did not arise from individual information searches as is the case in the archival 
data analyzed for this paper. 
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Who is Influential?: Cognitive Centrality 
The conceptualization of cognitive centrality derived from a view of decision-making 
groups as sociocognitive networks. Kameda, Ohtsubo, & Takezawa (1997) drew a parallel 
between social and cognitive networks and suggested that just as people share social links in a 
group, they also share cognitive links. Cognitive connections among group members are 
measured in terms of how much information they hold in common. A cognitively central 
member is someone whose knowledge is predominately shared with other members (i.e., has 
many information links to others) whereas a cognitively peripheral member knows mostly 
unique items (i.e., has few information links to others). Kameda et al. extended the idea of the 
greater influence of common information over unique information to the level of the member: 
they proposed that a member, who shares more information than another has greater influence in 
group discussion. Indeed, Kameda et al. (1997) showed that cognitively central members were 
more influential and participated more during the discussion. They showed this effect in a 
correlational study, as well in an experiment in which they controlled the distribution of 
information. The authors suggested that widely shared information is viewed reliable and 
credible and, as a result, cognitively central members come to be viewed as reliable and valid 
sources and are more influential in groups than cognitively peripheral members.  
Hypotheses 
Source of Data: Center for Creative Leadership 
For the results presented in this paper we analyzed archival data, obtained from the 
Center for Creative Leadership (CCL). CCL offers top-level executives a course on leadership 
and decision-making styles. As part of the seminar, executives participated in the Peak Selection 
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Simulation (PSS). One of the featured components in the PSS exercise was a small group 
decision-making task. 
Participants individually reviewed information about four candidates for presidency of a 
division of a hypothetical company. Although the company was hypothetical, the participants in 
the PSS exercise had already received extensive information about the company in general and 
the position in particular. The day after they reviewed the candidates’ computer files, participants 
met in small groups. During the group meetings, they discussed the candidates, ranked ordered 
the candidates and then recorded the strengths and weaknesses of each of the four candidates. 
Individuals had access to all of the available information about the candidates during their pre-
discussion computer searches; their information searches were only limited by the amount of 
time to search. All of the participants in the PSS decision-making groups were top level 
executives. Most were probably familiar with making personnel decisions for top-level positions 
in their companies. 
There are two features of the CCL exercise that are different from the typical study of 
information pooling in decision making teams. First and important for our purposes, the 
experimenters control who gets what information in the typical study (all studies to our 
knowledge) of information pooling. Participants in these studies received information passively 
and the experimenter determined what information was common and unique. In the CCL data, 
within any team, what was unique and common depended on what information members selected 
during their computer search. Unique information was information that only one member of the 
team accessed during the computer search. Common information was information that all 
members of the team independently accessed. This feature of the CCL task produces a process 
that resembles closely the dynamics that Burnstein and Vinokur (1973, 1977) envisioned in their 
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Persuasive Arguments Theory.  They presumed that common information arose because it was 
widely accessible and known in the population from which groups were composed but that 
unique information would be particularly influential when it arose in discussions. 
Second, the participants in the typical study of information pooling probably do not have 
significant experience with the decision task (see, Larson et al., 1996, for a notable exception). 
The participants in the CCL Leadership at the Peak (LAP) program had considerable experience 
and familiarity with decision tasks similar to the personnel selection exercise. 
Information Sampling 
 From the perspective of information sampling models such as CIS, there are two possible 
mechanisms, one local and one global, underlying the proposed effect that common information 
will be more likely to be mentioned than unique information. Locally, such an effect could be 
due to the collective sampling dynamics within a group. As predicted by the CIS model (Stasser 
& Titus, 1987; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989), common information has a higher chance of 
being mentioned as more group members know it and can mention it. With the archival data we 
can test whether for the biased information sampling effect to occur, the information distribution 
needs to be controlled. Because information access was not restricted, there is a possible second 
mechanism, operating more globally at the level of the population. Because participants were 
familiar with the task and were experienced at making personnel decisions, there was likely 
some degree of normative agreement about what kinds of information are relevant and important. 
Thus, participants probably searched for types of information that were generally regarded as 
important. Moreover, groups probably discussed the types of information that were commonly 
seen as important for the task. That is, shared perceptions of what was important information for 
making the decision may have guided information searches and subsequently shaped the content 
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of discussions. Thus, we expected that these executive teams produced information sampling 
patterns like those observed in the typical experimental, laboratory study of collective decision 
making, although the underlying mechanisms should differ. 
Hypothesis 1: CCL teams mentioned more common information than unique information during 
discussion.  
 We also investigated whether the popularity of information in the population of 
participants affected the likelihood that information was discussed in teams and whether the 
number of members of a team who viewed items could account for such normative effects. 
 Research Question 1: To what degree did the content of group discussions reflect the 
overall popularity of information in individual computer searches, and did the number of 
members who examined items within each team mediate the relationship between overall 
popularity and discussion content. Stated differently, do the local information sampling 
dynamics within teams (as suggested by the CIS model) account for a global relationship 
between the information searched by PSS participants and the content of group discussions? 
Information Repetition 
 Whereas we expected that the content of discussion would favor information that was 
accessed by all or most of a group’s members in their computer searches, we are also interested 
in how the sharedness of information affects group members’ repetition of items once they were 
mentioned. Stasser et al. (1989) and Larson, et al (1996) found that common items were repeated 
more than unique items, once they were mentioned. This repetition effect has been explained in 
terms of social validation: the accuracy of unique information can not be validated by others in 
the group. Moreover, beyond socially validating the accuracy of information, discussion may 
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have served to signal what information was viewed as relevant and important. That is, the 
number of members accessing a item during their searches may have signaled its importance. 
Access by all or most in a group suggests an item is widely viewed as important and relevant. 
Information accessed by only one member (unique information) may be viewed as consensually 
unimportant and dropped from further consideration.  
However, there is an important countervailing process in the CCL teams that is consistent 
with the implications of Persuasive Argument Theory and its assertion that novel information is 
influential.   Individuals actively acquired information in the PSS exercise, and they may have 
felt a sense of ownership for their unique items (Chernyshenko, Miner, Baumann, & Sniezek, 
2003; Van Swol, Savadori, & Sniezek, 2003). Thus, having mentioned an item that was new to 
others, they may have promoted its consideration by repeating it. Also, Larson and his colleagues 
(Larson et al., 1996; Larson et al., 1998) have shown that status and leadership roles promote the 
repetition of unique information. Similarly, Stewart and Stasser (1995), as well as Stasser, 
Vaughan & Stewart (2000) observed that mutually recognized expertise also promoted the 
repetition of unique items. Hence we considered two competing hypotheses regarding the 
repetition of information.  
Hypothesis 2a: CCL teams repeated more common than unique information.  
Hypothesis 2b: CCL teams repeated more unique than common information.  
Information Retention 
 The executive teams listed strengths and weaknesses for each candidate at the end of their 
discussions. Stewart and Stasser (1995) found that groups were less likely to record unique 
information than common information on their written summaries, again, presumably because 
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other members could not verify the accuracy of unique information or because it was considered 
as less important. However, for the same reasons that CCL teams may not have replicated the 
typical experimental finding of repeating more common than unique information during 
discussions, they may not have been so prone to omitting unique items from their strengths and 
weakness lists. For example, Stewart and Stasser (1995) also found that, when group members 
were explicitly assigned expertise for particular domains of information, unique information that 
emerged during discussions was as likely as common information to be retained on the group’s 
written protocol. Again, in the data set we analyze for the present investigation, all participants 
were CEOs and hence could be reasonably regarded as experts in tasks like the PSS. Moreover, 
if CCL teams repeated more unique than common items as predicted in the Hypothesis 2b, this 
repetition may have increased the likelihood that unique information would be salient and thus 
promoted its inclusion on the written protocols. Thus, as with repetition of information, we 
considered two competing hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3a: Groups will retain a larger proportion of common than unique information from 
their discussions on their written strengths and weaknesses sheets.  
Hypothesis 3b: Groups will retain a larger proportion of unique than common information from 
their discussions on their written strengths and weaknesses sheets.  
Who exerts the Influence? 
Investigating the mentioning, repeating and listing of information tells what groups 
discuss and emphasize in their discussion. However, analyzing the content of discussions and 
executive summaries does not tell us what kinds of information facilitate influence within the 
group. Is a person more influential if she holds a lot of unique knowledge which will be new to 
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others or if she shares a lot of knowledge with a lot of group members and is thus able to 
reinforce what they already know?  
We examined how team member’s centrality in the cognitive network of their team 
affected the degree to which they were successful in influencing the group to adopt their initial 
ranking of the job candidates. Participants gave their private and individual rankings of the 
alternatives before meeting as a group, and a comparison between these rankings and the group’s 
ranking was used to derive a measure of influence.  
Persuasive Arguments Theory suggests that a person who has information that the other 
team members do not have should be more influential (Vinokur & Burnstein, 1973). However, 
the concept of cognitive centrality implies that a person who shares a lot of information with 
other group members will exert more influence (Kameda et al., 1997). Considering both of these 
established theoretical concepts, we have two competing predictions concerning the influence. 
Hypothesis 4a: Cognitively central members were more influential than cognitively peripheral 
members. 
Hypothesis 4b: Cognitively peripheral members were more influential than cognitively central 
members. 
Kameda et al. (1997) also found that cognitively central members talked more during 
group discussions than did cognitively peripheral members. This raises the possibility that the 
influence attributed to cognitive centrality may be due in part to higher participation rates in 
discussions.  
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Research Question 2: In the CCL discussions, was centrality related to participation rates 
and, if so, does participation mediate in whole or partly the relationship of cognitive centrality 
and influence?  
Method 
Participants in CCL Executive Training 
All of the participants took part in the PSS exercise as part of a CCL seminar in Colorado 
Springs, Colorado. A subset of 25 groups was selected from the first 80 groups who completed 
the PSS program. In order to examine groups of comparable size, we eliminated groups smaller 
than four and larger than six.  Moreover, for our analyses we were forced to eliminate groups 
whose members’ search data were incomplete. 
Personnel Selection Task 
Before participants met at CCL, they received a packet of information about PSS. The 
packet contained information about a hypothetical company, Looking Glass, Incorporated, and 
abbreviated resumes for four candidates for the presidency of the Advanced Products Division of 
the company. During PSS, participants individually searched for and read information contained 
in a computer database about the job candidates. The information was presented through a series 
of menus representing different types of information available about each candidate. The major 
categories were interview questions and answers, resume, solicited and unsolicited opinions, and 
a personnel search report. Three of the four candidates were internal to the company and their 
information also included human resource files. 
The task was designed so that the available information closely resembled the types of 
information that executives would expect to have in a real hiring situation. Additionally, CCL 
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asked consultants to review the entire profiles and rank the candidates. This procedure yielded a 
“school solution” that we will subsequently refer to as the correct solution. Each candidate had 
roughly the same number of screens of information. There was no systematic attempt to balance 
strengths and weaknesses for each candidate across the various sources of information. 
Procedure 
Participants viewed a brief videotaped message from an actor portraying the CEO of 
Looking Glass, Inc., outlining the group’s task. Subsequently, individuals began their computer 
searches of the candidate information. After 60 minutes of searching and reviewing the 
information, participants ranked the four candidates. Then, the computer displayed a message 
that advised participants that they had completed the computer search portion of the PSS. They 
were instructed not to speak to anyone about their computer search until the small group 
discussions. 
During the search task, a record of what screens of information were accessed, in what 
order, and how long was kept for each participant. Additionally, the participant’s name, gender, 
and private ranking of the candidates were recorded.  
Participants met with their groups in a small room with a round table. The rooms had a 
large tablet of paper on one wall, a video camera in one corner on the ceiling, and a one-way 
mirror along one wall. All of the participants were aware that they were being videotaped as well 
as observed from a one-way mirror along one side of the room. A facilitator instructed each 
group to discuss the candidates, rank them, and record their strengths and weaknesses.  
Coding Scheme 
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Both the video-tapes of group discussions and the written summaries were coded for 
content. The coding scheme is divided into two categories: action codes and information codes. 
The action codes were developed to capture the nature of the discussants’ communications 
throughout the discussion. Codes represent actions such as stating a preference for a candidate, 
agreeing with another discussant, etc. The information codes were designed to code for the actual 
pieces of information that individuals mentioned about the candidates. 
In order to construct the information codes, numerical codes were assigned to the roughly 
400 pieces of information developed by CCL. The codes were constructed to capture the 
hierarchical nature of the way in which the information was presented to the subjects via a 
computer menu. The information was available to subjects through a menu that contained large 
categories of information (e.g., Resume, Interview, etc.). Within each of those larger categories 
were sub-categories of information (e.g., Work history, Education). Finally, each computer 
screen under a sub-category presented specific pieces of information (e.g., BA in business 
communication). The information codes were designed to retain as much information as 
participants might provide about the exact source and content of the information that s/he 
mentioned from the menu. Each tape was viewed by one of six trained coders who created a 
sequential record of discussion content. Nine of the 25 discussions were viewed by a second 
coder in order to estimate coder reliability. The two independent coders agreed 92% of the time 
on the presence and absence specific items of information in these nine discussion tapes.  
The same set of coders also read and recorded the content of the written executive 
summaries that the groups produced at the end of their discussions. Six of the lists were coded 
independently by two people. The two coders agreed 98% of the time on the presence and 
absence items of information in these six written protocols.  
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Measures 
Individual and Group Rankings 
After individuals completed their information search of the computer data base, they 
were prompted to rank the four candidates. In addition, each group ranked the four candidates at 
the end of their discussion. The individual rankings were compared to the group rankings and to 
the expert solution to assess members’ influence and correctness, respectively. 
Information Pooling 
The videotapes were coded for information that was mentioned during the group 
discussion. The coding system allowed us to record where the information was accessed (i.e., 
from which information source) as well as the actual content of the information. The information 
pooling analyses were conducted using the most specific level expressed by the information 
codes (e.g., “Cooper worked in Hungary”). Information was coded for the number of times each 
piece of information was mentioned and by whom. To capture the sharedness of information 
prior to discussion, information was coded as unique, partially shared, or common. Information 
accessed during the computer search by only one member of a group was categorized as unique, 
information accessed by more than one but not all members was designated as partially shared; 
and information accessed by all members was designated as common. 
 Cognitive Centrality 
Each individual received a cognitive centrality score. This score was calculated as in 
Kameda et al. (1997). The centrality score for each Member i, Ci, is given by: 
∑
=
′=
n
j
iji BBC
1
, 
where j ≠ i, n is group size, and B is a member (row) by information item (column) matrix. Each 
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row of this matrix corresponds to a member and each column to an information item. If member i 
looked at item j the entry cij = 1; otherwise, cij = 0. To construct this matrix, we determined 
which screens each individual member of the group accessed to determine which members 
viewed each item of information. The centrality score captures both the number of information 
links one shares with others in the group and the number of people with whom one shares these 
information links. In short, a high cognitive centrality score indicates multiple information links 
with other members whereas a low centrality score indicates that much of a member’s 
information is not known by others. 
 Participation Rates 
 In order to assess the relationships among centrality, influence and participation, we also 
computed the total number of codable utterances each person made during the discussion. 
Results 
Information Sampling 
 Information was categorized, for each group separately, as unique (one member viewed 
it), partially shared (two or more, but not all, members viewed it), and common (all members 
viewed it). On average, a group’s members collectively accessed a total of 316 items in their 
information search. Most of those items (187) were accessed by two or more, but not all, group 
members (partially shared). On average, 44 items were accessed by only one member (unique), 
and 85 items were accessed by all group members (common). The analyses of discussion content 
were based on the proportions of items that at least one member in a group had accessed. That is, 
a group could only discuss an item if at least one member accessed it. Across all levels of 
sharedness, participants mentioned only 8.7% of information that was looked at by at least one 
member of the group prior to discussion. That is, groups discussed, on average, about 27 items of 
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information. 
 A one-way ANOVA using level of information sharedness as a repeated measure factor 
was conducted on the proportions of unique, partially shared, and common information 
mentioned during discussion. There was a significant main effect for the level of sharedness, F(2, 
48)= 41.19, p<.000l. A Tukey test revealed that an item of information was significantly more 
likely to be mentioned during discussion if it was common (M=.127, SD=.058) than if it was 
partially shared (M=.083, SD=.032), p<.05. Moreover, partially shared information was 
mentioned significantly more often than unique information, (M=.037, SD=.034), p<.05. 
Information Repetition 
 The proportions of information repeated at least once after being mentioned were also 
analyzed in a one-way ANOVA using level of information sharedness as a repeated measure 
factor. This analysis showed the same pattern as above. There was a significant main effect for 
the level of sharedness, F(2, 48)= 20.03, p<.0001. A Tukey test showed that an item was 
significantly more likely to be discussed more than once, if it was common (M=.044, SD=.033) 
than if it was partially shared (M=.023 SD=.016), p<.05. Additionally, partially shared 
information was repeated significantly more often than unique information, (M=.008, SD=.012), 
p<.05. 
Information Listing  
 The proportions of information accessed by the group that were included on the written 
strengths and weakness protocols were analyzed in a one-way ANOVA using information 
sharedness as a repeated measure factor. Once again, there was a significant main effect for the 
level of sharedness, F(2, 48)=22.74, p<.0001. A Tukey test showed that an item was significantly 
more likely to be included on the list if it was common (M=.025, SD=.014) than if it was 
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partially shared (M=.014, SD=.013), p<.05. Furthermore, partially shared information was 
significantly more likely to be included on the list than unique information (M= .004, SD=.009), 
p<.05. 
 Summary. These results support our Hypothesis 1: the likelihood that individuals would 
mention an item increased when more people knew it prior to discussion. These results are 
consistent with much of the previous research in the information sampling literature (e.g., Stasser 
et al, 1989; Larson, et al., 1996). There was also support for the Hypothesis 2a in that common 
information was more likely to be repeated once it was mentioned than was unique and partially 
shared information. Additionally, Hypothesis 3a was supported in that common information was 
more likely to be included on the strength and weaknesses lists than were unique and partially 
shared information. 
Normative Value of Information 
 Due to the nature of the participant pool and their familiarity with the type of task, we 
suspected that a collective information sampling process due to the numbers of members 
accessing items might not be the only factor affecting discussion content. Both the likelihood 
that group members accessed an item and then later discussed it might be due to the perceived 
relevance or importance of the item to the decision task. To test the idea that members may have 
a shared script or a mental model guiding their selections, we examined the computer search data 
for 576 CCL participants whose group results data were not included because of missing data or 
identifiers that linked them to a specific group. For each item, we computed the proportion of 
these participants who accessed the item during their computer search. This proportion was used 
as an indicator of the normative understanding about an item’s perceived relevance or usefulness 
in the population of participants from which groups were composed. We computed the average 
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normativeness of common, partially shared, and unique information for each group. A one-way 
ANOVA using information sharedness as a repeated measure was conducted on these 
normativeness values, and a significant main effect for information sharedness emerged, F(2, 
48)=1291.93, p<.0001. A Tukey test showed that common information was significantly more 
normative (M=.85, SD=.029) than partially shared information (M=.60, SD=.028), p<.05. 
Likewise, partially shared information was more normative than unique information (M=.30, 
SD=.054), p<.05. Thus, not surprisingly, normativeness was strongly related to whether 
information was viewed by one, two or more, or all group members during their information 
search. This raises the possibility that the number of a group’s members accessing an item is a 
proxy for the normativeness and normativeness of information determines the likelihood that it 
will be discussed. Note that this complexity could not be discovered in laboratory studies 
because members are given information rather than allowed to search a database. 
 In order to further investigate the role of information normativeness, we conducted a 
series of multilevel regressions (Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, & Kashy, 2002) to predict 
whether items were mentioned, repeated and included on the strengths and weakness lists1. In 
these analyses, information items were treated as nested in the group. To predict whether an item 
was mentioned, we restricted the set of items with each group to those that accessed by at least 
one member of the group during the information search. (If not member accessed an item, it is 
structurally impossible for the group to discuss it.) For each item, we used the following 
predictors: the proportion of group members who accessed the item (sharedness) and the 
proportion of other CCL participants who also accessed the item (normativeness). For group 
level predictors, we computed the mean sharedness and mean normativeness of all items in the 
set accessed by at least one group member. In the regression including the item level predictor of 
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sharedness and the group level predictor of average sharedness of items, sharedness was a 
significant predictor of mentioning, F(1, 7878)= 99.81, p< .0001. Similarly, in the regression 
using normativeness as the item level predictor and average normativeness of all items accessed 
by the group, normativeness was a significant predictor of mentioning, F(1, 7878)= 144.42, p< 
.0001. When both item sharedness and normativeness (and their corresponding group level 
predictors) were entered in the regression simultaneously, only normativeness significantly 
predicted mentioning, F(1, 7877)= 44.84, p< .0001. In the presence of normativeness, sharedness 
was not significantly predictive, F(1, 7877)= 0.79, ns. Thus, the answer to Research Question 1 
is that discussion content did reflect the popularity of information in the larger population from 
which groups were composed and that local information sampling dynamics arising from the 
number of a group’s members who accessed an item only partially mediated this relationship. 
 A similar series of multilevel regressions were conducted to predict whether mentioned 
items were repeated. However, in these analyses, only the set of items mentioned at least once 
during the discussion were included, not the entire set accessed during the computer search by a 
group’s members. This restriction on the set of items considered is due to the fact that an item 
could not be repeated if it was not mentioned. In the regression including the item level predictor 
of sharedness and the group level predictor of average sharedness of items, sharedness was a 
significant predictor of whether an item was repeated once mentioned, F(1, 668)= 8.79, p< .004. 
Similarly, in the regression using normativeness as the item level predictor and average 
normativeness of all items accessed by the group, normativeness was a marginally significant 
predictor of repetition, F(1, 667)= 3.66, p< .06. When both item sharedness and normativeness 
(and their corresponding group level predictors) were entered in the regression simultaneously, 
only sharedness significantly predicted mentioning, F(1, 665)= 5.36, p<.03. In the presence of 
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sharedness, normativeness was not a significant predictor of repetition, F(1, 664)= 0.26, ns.. 
Whereas global normativeness was the best predictor of whether an item would be mentioned, 
local sharedness within the group predicted whether it would be repeated once mentioned. The 
more members who had accessed an item during their computer search, the more likely it would 
be repeated once it was mentioned. Thus consistent with Hypothesis 2a and the ANOVA’s 
examining the effects of sharedness on repetition: degree of sharedness promoted the repetition 
of items once they are introduced into discussion. 
 We also conducted a series of multilevel regressions to predict whether a discussed item 
would be included on the strengths and weaknesses lists. We also considered repetition as a 
potential predictor because preliminary analyses showed that a higher proportion (.29) of items 
that were repeated during discussion were included in the lists than items that were mentioned 
but not repeated (.14), χ2 (1, N=694) = 22.4, p< .0001. Both sharedness and normativeness (in 
the presence of their respective group level averages) by themselves were significant predictors, 
F(1, 670)= 2.15, p<.04, and F(1, 670)= 2.25, p<.03, respectively. However, when repetition was 
included as a predictor, neither sharedness nor normativeness were significant predictors, F(1, 
668)= 0.07, ns., and F(1, 668)= 1.12, ns., respectively. In this regression including all predictors, 
repetition during discussion remained highly predictive of inclusion of an item on the final list, 
F(1, 665)= 22.47, p<.0001. 
______________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1here 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the results of these regressions and includes the significant 
standardized regression weights and their standard errors. As the figure illustrates, normativeness 
predicted whether an item would be mentioned during discussion but the number of group 
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members who accessed the item predicted whether it would be repeated once it was mentioned. 
Neither sharedness nor normativeness had a direct influence on the retention of an item on the 
strength and weakness list compiled at the end of discussion. However, repeated items were 
much more likely to be included than items that were not repeated during discussion. This 
pattern of findings suggests that the apparent influence of sharedness on the inclusion of an item 
on a list was mediated by repetition. 
Cognitive Centrality  
 Hypotheses 4a and b addressed the relationship between cognitive centrality and 
influence in the group. Cognitive centrality scores were calculated for each group member based 
on the formula given in Kameda et al. (1997) and described earlier. The mean cognitive 
centrality score for an individual in this sample is 654, SD=137. One can think of this index as 
representing the number of information links between a member and the rest of his/her group. 
 In order to assess the relationship between cognitive centrality and influence during 
discussion, an influence score was computed based on the distance between individuals’ pre-
discussion ranking and their group’s final ranking of the candidates. This influence could take on 
values from ‘0’ to ‘10.’ A score of ‘10’ indicates no difference between the individual and the 
group ranking, and a ‘0’ indicates that the group’s ranking was the inverse of the individual’s 
original ranking. The mean influence score for an individual in this sample is 7.5, SD=2.23, 
indicating that group rankings were, not surprisingly, similar but not identical to the typical 
member’s ranking. 
 Group rankings were closer to the expert solution (M = 8.38, SD=1.93) than were the 
members' initial rankings (M = 7.31, SD=1.19), F(1, 23) = 7.92, p < .01. As a result, members 
whose initial ranking was close to the expert solution would appear to be influential. Indeed, 
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being correct may have enhanced one’s influence but we wanted to control for correctness in 
evaluating the relationship of cognitive centrality and influence. Thus, we also computed a 
correctness index for each member. The index was computed like the influence index except it 
was based on the ranking contained in the expert solution, rather than the group’s ranking. As 
with the influence score, the correctness score could vary from ‘0’ to ‘10.’ A ‘10’ indicates that 
an individual’s ranking was identical to the expert solution and a ‘0’ indicates that the 
individual’s ranking was the inverse of the expert solution.  
 In order to investigate the effect of cognitive centrality on influence, we conducted a 
series of multilevel regressions. In these analyses, members were nested within groups. For each 
member, we used the following predictors: cognitive centrality and closeness of the member’s 
initial ranking to the expert solution (correctness). For group level predictors, we computed the 
mean centrality and mean correctness for other members of the group. In the regression 
including member centrality and the group level predictor of average centrality of others, 
member centrality was positively related to influence, F(1, 107)= 25.80, p< .0001. Additionally, 
the average centrality of others in the group was negatively related to influence, F(1, 98.8)= 
13.34, p< .001. That is, a member was influential to the degree that s/he was cognitively central 
and the remaining members of the group were not. In the regression using correctness as the 
member level predictor and average correctness of the others in the group as the group level 
predictor, only correctness was a significant predictor of influence, F(1, 123)= 32.13, p< .0001. 
When both cognitive centrality and correctness (and their corresponding group level predictors) 
were entered in the regression simultaneously, both remained significant predictors of influence, 
F(1, 104)= 13.16, p< .001 and F(1, 121)= 18.78, p< .0001. Additionally, the average centrality of 
the other members was also still negatively related to influence, F(1, 106)= 4.67, p< .04. The 
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implication is that cognitively central members were more influential in moving the group 
toward their initial solution than were their more cognitively peripheral peers. It also helped if 
the member’s initial solution was close to the expert solution and other members of the group 
were relatively cognitively peripheral. We considered the possibility that the individuals who 
accessed more information had higher centrality scores (i.e., more informational overlap with 
other simply by virtue of having more information) and were more influential. However, when 
the total amount of information accessed was added to the regression model for predicting 
influence, it was not a significant predictor, F(1, 106)= 0.76, ns, and member centrality, average 
group centrality and member correctness remained significant predictors. Figure 2 summarizes 
these findings and includes the significant standardized regression weights and their standard 
errors.  
To answer Research Question 2 regarding the role of participation rates in influence, we 
measured participation by counting the total number of utterances for each individual. We 
correlated member influence (the distance between an individuals’ ranking and the group 
ranking) and participation within each group. The mean correlation between participation and 
group influence across all groups (M = -.01; SD = .35) was not significantly different from 0, 
t(22)=-.20, p = .84. Thus, influence was not due to high participation. The mean correlations 
across groups between participation and correctness (M =-.04, SD=.35) and participation and 
centrality (M=.03, SD=.30) were likewise not significantly different from 0, t(23)=-.57, p=.58 
and t(23)=.46, p=.64, respectively. 
______________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
__________________________________________________ 
 
 Thus, Hypothesis 4a received strong support. Consistent with the hypothesis, cognitively 
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central members were more influential than peripheral members. Cognitively central members 
did not, however, participate more than cognitively peripheral members did and thus did not 
mediate the effect of centrality on influence. 
Discussion 
 At the onset, we identified two broadly defined goals that underlie many of the reasons 
for delegating decisions to groups. One goal treats the group as a representative body of a larger 
population of stakeholders and is aimed at extracting common information, perspectives, and 
sentiments - a process of zooming in on common ground. The other goal treats the group as a 
mechanism for disseminating information that is not commonly known and airing diverse 
perspectives – a process of zooming out to encompass all that is collectively known. We 
examined information flow and influence in decision making teams to assess whether emergent 
processes in face-to-face decision making groups tended to realize one of these goals at the 
expense of the other. The decision making teams had completed a hiring simulation that had 
been designed to emulate many decisions that organizations face. Most notably, participants had 
first reviewed information about candidates for a top-level management position in preparation 
for a group meeting and formed tentative preferences. Then they had met and discussed the 
candidates with the objective of producing a collective ranking and creating an executive 
summary of the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate. The information processing and 
influence patterns in these groups were more suited to highlighting shared perspectives than to 
identifying and integrating diverse perspectives. We first summarize these findings. Then, we 
address the implications of these findings for collective decisions in organizational contexts.  
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Information Sampling 
Unique information was less likely to be mentioned than common information. Several 
reasons that have been advanced to explain such a finding: collective information sampling 
(Larson et al., Stasser & Titus, 1987; Stasser, et al, 1989), advocacy of initial preferences (e.g., 
Gigone and Hastie, 1993, 1996; Stasser, 1988), and attributing more importance to information 
encountered before discussion (Schulz-Hardt, et al., 2000). However, these explanations cannot 
readily explain the finding that the popularity of items among the broader sample of CCL 
participants was a better predictor of which items were mentioned than the number of team 
members who accessed the items. We had thought that, to the degree that discussion content 
reflected the popularity of information in general, this reflection would occur for three reasons. 
First, CLL members shared a norm regarding what types of information were more important or 
relevant in making the hiring decisions (Tindale & Kameda, 2000). Second, because of this 
shared norm, the popularity of information among CCL participants would predict what items a 
team’s members would access. Third, the frequency of access at the team level would determine 
what items were likely to be discussed. To explain the direct impact of popularity 
(normativeness) on discussion requires a fourth reason (see Figure 1): team members 
contributions to discussion were also filtered by normative concerns. Hence normative concerns 
exerted their influence twice in the process -- once during the individuals’ information searches 
and second during the teams’ discussions. 
Repetition of Information  
 Common information was more likely to be repeated than was unique and partially 
shared information. Whereas normativeness predicted which items were mentioned, the number 
of group members who accessed the item before discussion (team sharedness) predicted whether 
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an item was repeated after it was mentioned. Once a piece of information was mentioned, it was 
more likely to receive additional consideration if all members knew it before discussion.  
Retention of Information on Written Summary 
Common information had a higher chance to end up on a written protocol than unique 
and partially shared information. However, the effect of sharedness on the retention of 
information on the written summaries is indirect. Repetition of information during discussion 
directly predicted whether an item was retained on the written record. Normativeness had a 
distal, indirect effect in that it predicted what was mentioned during discussion. Team sharedness 
had a more proximal, but still indirect, effect in that it predicted what items were repeated. This 
pattern suggests that information that was repeated was salient to the group members at the time 
that they constructed the executive summaries. Moreover, it is possible that the sheer repetition 
made the information seem more credible and important. 
In sum, an implicit normative understanding about what types of information are relevant 
for a task seemingly guided what information was brought up during group discussion. But 
beyond shaping the initial content of discussion, normativeness did not have a direct impact. 
What information was repeated during group discussion was related to how many members 
accessed it before discussion. What kind of information ended up on the summary list, 
presumably reflecting what was deemed important and supportive of the final decision, was 
shaped by the things that were repeated. Thus, indirectly, how many members of a group 
accessed an item during their individual information searches affected the likelihood that the 
item would be retained on the final written record. One noteworthy implication is that each step 
of this process acts in the direction of extracting what is most commonly known and works 
against the introduction of novel information. In the end, group discussion and collectively 
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written executive summaries are more a distillation of what is commonly known than an 
integration of common with novel or unique knowledge. 
Who Was Influential? 
Persuasive argument theory suggests it is unique information is persuasive and hence 
shapes team decisions, whereas cognitive centrality suggests the opposite. The idea of cognitive 
centrality assumes that people can be linked to one another in a cognitive network of common 
knowledge. Kameda et al. (1997) found evidence that cognitively central people were more 
influential and participated more in their groups. In the current data, we also found that member 
centrality was positively related to influence. The influence of central members was not due to 
their being more correct, having more information than others or their participating more during 
group discussion. There was virtually no correlation between participation and cognitive 
centrality or between participation and correctness. Further, participation was not correlated with 
group influence. Although this is a null finding, it is interesting in its own right. It counters the 
somewhat cynical view that one can be influential by simply talking a lot. Moreover, it suggests 
that what was said was more important than how much was said in these executive teams. This 
finding is inconsistent with other research that has shown that people use participation rates as an 
indication of correctness or degree of expertise (e.g., Littlepage, Schmidt, Whisler, & Frost, 
1995). Perhaps, the CCL participants have learned to focus more on the quality than the quantity 
of contributions to judge competence and expertise. As participation was not related to 
correctness in the current data, the executives were well served to ignore talkativeness as a 
heuristic cue for competence.  
It is also important to note that the current data used participation rates that were based on 
an objective measure derived from coding video tapes of discussion. Often research on 
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participation uses group members’ estimates of participation as an index of participation (e.g., 
Kameda et al., 1997; Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992). It is possible that people who were influential 
in the current groups were also perceived by other in the team as high participators, when in fact 
they were not. If participants had ranked each another’s participation, as they did in Kameda et 
al.’s study (1997), they may have ranked central and correct members as high relative to others 
regardless of their actual participation rates. 
Managing Decision-Making Teams 
Our findings imply that common information signals something, just because it is 
common, meaning that all group members were searching for that information. Moreover, what 
is commonly known before group discussion is amplified in the contents of discussion, and the 
choice supported by what is commonly known will likely be the group’s choice. In short, our 
results suggest that group discussions amplify common information and do not effectively 
disseminate unique information. 
The finding that cognitively central members were more influential adds another layer of 
evidence that group choice is an effective mechanism for identifying options that are supported 
by common information. Stated simply, the influence of a member is enhanced if she shares a lot 
of information with other members. Members who bring diverse information to the group will be 
cognitively peripheral, and their influence will be compromised. That is, having different 
information than others in a group decreased the ability to persuade others to adopt one’s 
solution. Thus, unique information was not a valued commodity but was a liability in the 
influence process. 
If the goal is to articulate widely shared information and to decide an issue based on what 
is commonly known, then group discussion and decision making is a useful vehicle for doing so. 
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We found that the groups’ solutions were closer to the correct solution than were individuals’ 
initially proposed solutions. Given that there is a normative solution approach to a decision 
problem, and that approach is indeed correct, then groups are better in making a decision than 
individuals. In contrast, if the normative perspective does not lead to the best choice and 
consideration of unique information would, then the goal should be to foster the impact of novel 
information on the group’s collective decision. 
If the goal is integrate diverse knowledge and to identify decision options that are 
supported by combining unique knowledge, then it is dangerous to assume that group discussions 
-- particularly unstructured, face-to-face discussions – will realize such a goal. One obvious 
implication is that the reasons for delegating decisions to groups need to be considered carefully. 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that group decisions are more likely to be supported by 
common than by collective knowledge. Collective knowledge is the sum of what is known by a 
group members and includes both common and unique information. In order to ascertain whether 
a decision is supported by collective knowledge, it is essential that unique information be fully 
explored and considered in the decision-making process. 
 If the goal is to construct an account of collective knowledge, then groups must be 
composed and their interactions structured with that goal in mind. One way to enhance the 
consideration of unique information is to assign members expert roles (Stasser et al., 1995, 2000; 
Stewart and Stasser, 1995). We analyzed archival data from an executive training session and 
hence were subject to many constraints in our investigation. However, in our data set, the role 
and within group variation of expertise maps much better on real world decision making groups, 
than is often the case for experimental studies. In experimental studies, members are assigned 
expert roles and, when such assignments are made salient, experts were more likely to repeat 
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unique information. Most groups in organizational contexts would be more similar to the CCL 
team than to laboratory groups in this respect. That is, members’ expertise is often not apparent 
or salient. 
Moreover, in decision making groups in real life, it is unlikely that they would consist of 
experts and non-experts making a decision about issues that fall within the area of expertise of 
one or more of the group members. The most important decision making groups in real life 
consist of experts only. Think of the board of a company, the Federal Open Market Committee of 
the Federal Reserve Bank, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, all small 
groups consisting of experts of equally high status, who make decisions that vastly influence our 
economy and consequently to a great deal our economic well-being. For this sort of real life 
decision making groups, the CCL results have relevant implications. Because members of the 
executive teams were all high status, leaders who were experienced at group decision-making 
and consequently they were more or less equal to one another. In order to benefit from the 
potential of such a high powered group in situations which demand novel solutions, we should 
differentiate the team member’s roles and make salient their complementary domains of 
expertise (Stasser, et al., 1995). Although a great part of the expertise and knowledge will 
overlap, we should make the smaller part that each of them carries uniquely highly salient. The 
bits of unique expertise that each can offer need to be mutually recognized. Finally, to 
successfully air and integrate their unique knowledge, they need to be motivated to do so. That 
is, there needs to be an expectation that collective knowledge will likely support different 
decisions than common knowledge. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Predicting whether an item will be mentioned, repeated and listed; standardized partial 
regression included for significant links with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Figure 2. Predicting member influence from member centrality, average group centrality, and 
correctness of member’s initial solution; partial regression coefficients included for significant 
links with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
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Normative
Access
Team
Sharedness
Mentioned?
Yes or No
Repeated?
Yes or No
Listed?
Yes or No
a.
a. Structural Link: Information could only be repeated if it was already mentioned.
.12 (.018)***
.26 (.110)*
.78 (.007)***
.15 (.032)***
*** p<.0001; * p<.05
 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicting whether an item will be mentioned, repeated and listed; standardized partial 
regression included for significant links with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
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Centrality
Correctness
Influence
.48 (.133)**
.36 (.082)***
.80 (.053)***
*** p<.0001; ** p < .001; * p<.05
Group
Centrality
-.30 (.140)*
 
 
Figure 2. Predicting member influence from member centrality, average group centrality, and 
correctness of member’s initial solution; partial regression coefficients included for significant 
links with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
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